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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON, : 
Appellate Court No. 20070643 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated July 13, 2007. The 
Defendant was sentenced to serve three terms of one to fifteen years, one year 
and six months all to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to a matter 
the Defendant had previously been sentenced to prison on. Jurisdiction for the 
Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE OFFICER HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE DEFENDANT? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact should be analyzed under 
a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of law 
should be reviewed under a correction of error standard of review. "In 
reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, in reviewing the court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citations omitted). 
Preservation—This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant's attorney 
filed a motion to suppress and when he entered a Sery plea to the charge. (R. 
20-28,63/3). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-
6-204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial 
terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or 
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti as 
defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another; 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), a second degree felony; Possession of Drug paraphernalia in a Drug 
Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l), and 
criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-
206(2)(a). 
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 20). After a 
hearing on the motion, the court denied Defendant's motion. (R. 50). There 
were no Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed. The Defendant plead 
guilty to all charges and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison where the 
sentences on this case were ordered to run concurrent to each other, but 
consecutive to another case the Defendant had already been sentenced on. (R. 
50-52) The Defendant entered a conditional plea pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988 )(R. 63/3). A notice of Appeal was filed on 
August 1,2007. (R. 53). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 2, 2007, Officer Francom of the Ogden Police Department 
received a dispatch that there was a disturbance in the hills behind some 
residences. There was a report that someone thought they heard kids running 
around with flashlights and shooting paint ball guns. Approximately five to ten 
minutes later, Officer Francom responded to the area which was at 1100 North 
Mountain Road. (R. 61/4). 
Officer Francom initially spoke with a neighbor in the area who showed 
the officer where he saw the people causing the disturbance. Officer Francom 
then drove to the Nature Center Parking lot. This parking lot is on the east side 
of Mountain Road. There's a gate around the parking lot except for the 
entrance. Behind the parking lot are some trails. (R. 61/5). The trails are 
connected with the nature center and also lead up behind the homes where 
phone call to dispatch originated from. (R. 61/6). Officer Francom testified 
that "as far as I know, no one is to be in a trailhead from dusk - Fm sorry, from 
dark until dusk." (R. 61/6). 
When Officer Francom arrived in the parking lot he noticed a vehicle 
backed up in the center of the lot facing Mountain Road. (R. 61/7). There 
were two occupants of the vehicle. The officer made contact with the driver 
who identified himself with his driver's license. (R. 61/8). Officer Francom 
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testified that he contacted the driver "because to the best of my knowledge 
those individuals were trespassing in a city park after dark." (R. 61/8). 
After Officer Francom informed the driver that he was trespassing he 
walked around the car and obtained personal information from the front 
passenger who is the Defendant in this matter. (R. 61/8-9). After Officer 
Francom obtained the Defendant's personal information he went back to his 
patrol vehicle and ran both individuals information through his system. He 
testified that the individuals were not free to leave while he did this. (R. 61/9). 
Officer Francom discovered that there was a warrant out for the 
Defendant. Officer Francom took the Defendant into custody and searched 
him incident to arrest. (R. 61/9-11). While Officer Francom was handcuffing 
the Defendant he asked him if he had anything illegal on his person. The 
Defendant indicated that he had "meth." The officer located methamphetamine 
in the Defendant's front pocket. (R. 61/11). 
There were pictures of the trailhead admitted into evidence. None of the 
signs indicated what time the trailheads closed. The prosecutor asked the 
question of the officer, "So whatever the hours are is just based upon your 
understanding about what trailheads are." Officer Francom answered, 
"Correct." (R. 61/13). 
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Although this information was not presented at the evidentiary hearing, 
the State alleged in its response to Defendant's motion to suppress that the 
Ogden Nature Center is maintained and operated by a private, non-profit 
company on land that is leased to them by Ogden City. The Nature Center 
trails are closed from dusk until dawn. However, notice of that fact is not 
given until after one has left the parking lot and started on the trail. At this 
point there is a bulletin board with a sign that reads, 'The park is open from 
dawn until dusk." (R. 35-36) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Officer Francom detained the Defendant because he mistakenly believed 
that the "Nature Center" was a city park and that Defendant was violating the 
city park trespassing ordinance. The Nature Center parking lot is not a city 
park, and there is no notice given that one can't be in this parking lot after dark. 
Therefore, there were no specific and articulable facts to suggest that the 
Defendant was involved in criminal activity when Officer Francom detained 
him. 
Even though a neighbor reported seeing some kids on the nearby trails, 
Officer Francom didn't corroborate in any way that Defendant had been 
trespassing on the trails. For these reasons, the evidence that was eventually 
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found on Defendant's person should have been suppressed by the trial court as 
it was found following an unlawful stop. 
ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE 
DEFENDANT. 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible 
encounters between law enforcement officers and the general public. 
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman, 739 
P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(citations omitted). 
A level one encounter "is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time." State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In contrast, a level two stop 
occurs "when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, would 
believe he or she is not free to leave." Id. It is a level two stop "even if the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even if the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the detention is brief. See, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979). The same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to 
determine if there are sufficient specific and articulable facts to support 
reasonable suspicion as is used to determine if there is probable cause. See, 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In addition, "the 
State bears the initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop." Id. 
In the case at bar, Officer Francom testified that the Defendant was not 
free to go while the warrants check was being ran. (R. 61/9). Therefore, this 
was a level two detention where the officer needed "specific, articulable facts 
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The "facts" presented by the State at the suppression hearing were: 
(1) There was a call to dispatch that there was a disturbance 
happening in the hills behind some residences where someone 
thought they heard kids running around with flashlights shooting 
paint ball guns. 
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(2) Five to ten minutes later Officer Francom arrived and spoke with a 
resident in the neighborhood. This individual told Officer 
Francom approximately where the people were that he saw. 
(3) There are trails associated with the nature center, but the officer 
wasn't sure how they were connected. 
(4) The trails behind the nature center would take someone behind the 
homes where the complaint originated from. 
(5) As far as Officer Francom knew, the trails were closed after dark. 
(6) There were photographs of the entrance to the trailhead admitted 
into evidence. There were no signs that showed the hours that the 
trails are open. 
(7) At the entrance to the trails, there's an "arbor" that you have to 
walk under to get on the trails. 
(8) Officer Francom drove to the nature center parking lot and noticed 
a vehicle parked there. 
(9) Officer Francom detained the occupants of the vehicle, gathered 
their personal information, and then ran a warrants check on them. 
(10) Officer Francom detained the occupants of the vehicle because he 
believed that they were trespassing in a city park after dark. 
(11) During the warrants check, Officer Francom discovered that the 
Defendant, who was in the front passenger's seat, had a warrant 
for his arrest. 
(12) During a search incident to arrest methamphetamine was 
discovered in the Defendant's pants pocket. 
(R. 61/4-13) Those were the facts that were testified to at the suppression 
hearing that the officer relied on to justify his stop of the Defendant. There 
was additional information provided in Defendant's and the State's brief that is 
included in the record. Defendant submitted a copy of the city ordinance that 
prohibits trespassing in city parks. The ordinance specifically requires time 
restrictions to be posted at the main entrance to the park. (R. 28). 
In the State's response memorandum the State concedes that the nature 
center is not a city park subject to the city ordinance.1 The argument the State 
made in its memorandum was that Officer Francom had reasonable suspicion 
to investigate a trespass. (R. 34-43). 
The elements of trespass are; 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if. . . 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or 
damage to any property, including the use of graffiti. . . 
1
 Officer Francom testified that he stopped the vehicle because he believed that the occupants were violating 
the city park ordinance. (R. 61/8). 
11 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; 
or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for 
the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or 
someone with apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude 
intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention 
of intruders . . . 
U.C.A. §76-6-206. 
There was nothing in the facts of this case that would cause a reasonable 
person to believe that Defendant had violated that statute. The Defendant was 
sitting in a parked vehicle in a parking lot that connects to a trail system in the 
Ogden foothills. There was nothing presented at the suppression hearing to 
suggest that Defendant was there to cause annoyance, commit a crime or cause 
another to fear for his safety. In addition, there had been no personal 
communication to the Defendant, and there were no signs posted for the 
parking lot giving notice of the trail hours. There are no specific, articulable 
facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the Defendant was 
involved in criminal activity. Officer Francom stopped the Defendant based on 
his mistaken belief that this parking lot was a city park, and the Defendant was 
in violation of the city park ordinance. 
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There was nothing in the officer's personal observations that gave him 
reasonable suspicion the Defendant was involved in criminal activity. In 
general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable 
suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and 
inferences." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
However, there are times when an officer can rely on "external 
information - e.g., an informant's tip via police dispatch." Kaysville City v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "[I]f the investigating 
officer cannot provide independent or corroborating information through his or 
her own observations, the legality of a stop based on information imparted by 
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the 
individual originating the information . . . ." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
There are three factors to be considered in determining reasonable 
suspicion when information comes from an informant. See, Kaysville City v. 
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. "As our first factor, we focus on the type of tip or 
informant involved." Id. 
There is very little known in this case about who the informant was. It 
was apparently a neighbor who "heard some kids running around back there, 
shooting paint ball guns" in the hills above his home. (R. 61/4). In addition to 
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the call to dispatch, Officer Francom talked to an individual in the area who 
told Officer Francom where he saw the individuals. (R. 61/5). There is 
nothing in the record to suggest that this person was not reliable. 
The second factor is "whether the informant gave enough detail about 
the observed criminal activity to support a stop." Id. at 236. In this case, the 
informant reported that there were people on closed trails causing a 
disturbance, shooting paint ball guns, etc. 
The final factor is whether the police officer's personal observations 
confirm the dispatcher's report of the informant's tip. Id. The officer may 
corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by finding the 
person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the 
informant." Id. (quoting, State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. 1994). In the 
case at bar, there was no corroboration of the informant's tip as it related to the 
Defendant. 
There was no evidence presented that would cause a reasonable person 
to believe that Defendant was one of the "kids" on the trails. He was a 
passenger in a vehicle parked in a nearby parking lot. The officer did not find 
the Defendant in the location in the hills where the disturbance was reported. 
Furthermore, the officer didn't observe any paintball guns or flashlights or 
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observe anything else that would corroborate that Defendant had been in the 
hills. 
The officer detained the Defendant on the mistaken belief that Defendant 
was violating the city's trespassing in a city park ordinance. For these reasons 
the officer didn't have reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant and the 
evidence which was discovered should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Francom lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant. 
The evidence against the Defendant was discovered as a result of this unlawful 
detention. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
>rd DATED this 3rG day of January 2008. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Ryan Tenney, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 
-th 300 South, 6in Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180, 
th postage prepaid this 11 day of June 2007 
torney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
RULING 
S ENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071900647 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Date: July 12, 2007 
pi! IB 208* 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 11, 1979 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB071207 Tape Count: 11:00-11:02* 
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CHARGES 
1. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty 
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty 
3 . CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/12/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for ruling of the court as to the Motion to 
Suppress filed by defendant. Defendant is present in custody with 
the Utah State Prison and is represented by Michael Bouwhuis, 
public defender. 
Based on the facts, the Court denies the Motion to Suppress. 
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11 
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court. 
Defendant enters a seary plea of guilty to all counts as charged 
Page 1 ?50 
Case No: 071900647 
Date: Jul 12, 2007 
and waives time for sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence as to each count and 
concurrent with 071901442, however, consecutive to the defendant's 
current sentence. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court orders restitution of $297.41 on behalf of Ogden Mini 
Mart and Big 5 Sports to be collected by the Department of 
Corrections upon the defendant's parole. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 3 65 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL TRESPASS a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 18 0 day(s) 
Page 2 
Case No: 071900647 
Date: Jul 12, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The defendant elects to serve the jail in the Utah State Prison. 
* Case is recalled on the calendar 11:40-11:49. 
Dated t h i s JJL day of %JUh „ J^OJSLZ 
PARLEY R BM.DWIN 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
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THE 
071900647. 
MR. 
file with -~ 
THE 
MR. 
(unintelligi 
THE 
evidence in 
MR. 
Officer Jare 
THE 
Mr . 
MR. 
housekeeping 
take brief t 
P 
CLERK: 
R O C E E D I N G S 
State of Utah versus Derrall Dickerson, 
This is time set for a suppression hearing. 
DECARIA: 
COURT: 
DECARIA: 
ble) . 
COURT: 
Your Honor, I have 
Thank you. 
-- the Court today 
Thank you. Ready to 
this matter? 
DECARIA: We are, Your Honor 
d Francom to the stand. 
COURT: Thank you. 
a memorandum to 
Actually 
proceed 
I wou. 
Bouwhuis, you1re ready to proceed? 
BOUWHUIS: We are. Just a -
, Your Honor. Our intention 
estimony 
the case later. 
from the officer, an 
- just a 
today is 
to take 
Id call 
matter of 
just to 
d then we'll argue 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Both briefs have 
been filed. 
JARED FRANCOM, 
being first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
now 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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BY MR. DECARIA: 
Q. 
Departme 
A. 
Q-
dispatch 
neighbor 
correct? 
A. 
Q-
You 
nt. 
Yes, 
And 
re Officer Francom 
Is that correct? 
sir. 
on the 2nd of Apri 
ed to investigate some 
hood 
Yes 
of, I guess, 1100 
r sir. 
Describe what the nati 
was. What were you informed? 
A. 
happenin 
thought 
shooting 
that. 
We i 
g in 
that 
pai 
rf.ere informed that 
with the 
1 of this 
noise 
North 
ire of 
there 
and 
Ogden City Police 
year you were 
disturbance in the 
Mountain Road. Is that 
the 
was 
the hills behind some resid 
they heard some kids runnin 
nt ball guns, with flashligh 
dispatch actually 
a disturbance 
ences. Some people 
g around back there, 
ts, and stuff like 
Q. Okay. So after receiving that dispatch, how long 
did it take you to get to the area? 
A. Probably no less than five to 10 minutes, somewhere 
in there. 
Q. Okay. Five to 10 minutes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where did you go? 
A. At first I drove up a roadway that cut up to the 
back of the trails, which I later found out was a private 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 driveway when I met the resident of the house. He told me 
2 about the approximate area he saw the individuals. I then 
3 drove down his driveway back out onto Mountain Road and went 
4 to the nature center parking lot. 
5 Q. Okay. The nature center parking lot -- describe the 
6 approximate address of that location. 
7 A. It's approximately 1100 Mountain Road -- North 
8 Mountain Road. 
9 Q. Okay. Now, describe the way that's laid out. Is --
10 have you been to that area before on that -- than that 
11 night -- other than that night? 
12 A. I've been in that area, but I have not been to the 
13 nature center. 
14 Q. Okay. There's a parking lot there. Is that 
15 correct? 
16 A. Yes, sir. 
17 Q. Okay. Is that where you proceeded? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. All right. Now, describe the parking lot. 
20 A. It's on the east side of Mountain Road. You pull in 
21 there. There's a gate all the way around it except for the 
22 entrance there that allows you to enter. And then behind the 
23 parking lot are some trails that you go back behind. 
24 (Counsel confer.) 
25 MR. DECARIA: Are these your photographs? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
801.395. 1056 
MR. BOUWHUIS: They are. You can use them. 
Q (BY MR. DECARIA) With regard to the trails, are 
those trails connected with the nature center? 
A. As far as I know, yes. 
Q. And how would you know that they were connected with 
the nature center? 
A. I just -- I -- as far as I know, they are. I'm not 
sure how they are connected. 
Q. Okay. Are those trails also the trails that might 
proceed up around the back side of the homes that -- where 
the neighbors called? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. So in order to get behind the homes that 
you're describing, is the main access to that -- those trails 
at that particular sort of trailhead? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, is that a trailhead, as far as you know? 
A. As far as I know, yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. What is your knowledge as to what the 
restrictions are on trailheads? 
A. As far as I know, no one is to be in a trailhead 
from dusk -- I'm sorry, from dark until dusk, 
Q. Okay. So the open hours are from day -- daylight 
hours. 
A. Correct. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 Q. From dawn until dusk --
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. -- is that correct? 
4 A. Yes,sir. 
5 Q. Okay. So did you see a vehicle in that parking lot? 
6 A. I did. 
7 Q. And where was the vehicle parked? 
8 A. The vehicle was backed up in the center of the 
9 parking lot, 'not in any parking stall particularly, facing 
10 Mountain Road. 
11 Q. Facing Mountain Road? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 Q. And how far from -- I mean, just if you can estimate 
14 in feet, from access to those trails? 
15 A. Fifty feet. 
16 Q. And d i d you c o n t a c t i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 
17 vehicle? 
18 A. I did. 
19 Q. How many individuals were either there by the 
20 vehicle or in the vehicle? 
21 A. There was two. 
22 Q. Were they in the vehicle at the time? 
23 I A. Yes, sir. 
24 | Q. Were the doors opened or closed? 
25 | A. They were both closed. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
can't --
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
my knowl 
park aft 
Q. 
trailhea 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. And who did you contact first? 1 
I first contacted the driver. 
Okay. And was he identified to you? I 
Yes, sir. 
How did he identify himself? 
State ID, I believe, or driver's license. I 
one of those two. 
Okay. 
Yeah, he had a driver's -- identification card. 
And for what purpose did you contact the driver? 
Well, I contacted the driver because to the best of 
edge those individuals were trespassing in a city 
er dark. 
Okay. So in other words, your understanding is that 
ds are essentially city park? 
Yes, sir. 
And that if someone is in there that they're 
trespassing if the -- if they're beyond -- previous to 
dusk -- I mean, beyond dusk and before dawn? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. Did you inform the driver of that? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. And did you then contact the passenger of the 
vehicle as well? 
A. Yes,sir. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 Q. And how did you do that? 
2 A. Just walked around the car and -- let's see. Yeah, 
3 as far as I remember, I walked around the car and just 
4 gathered his information as well. I may have just leaned 
5 across. I don't remember. 
6 Q. Okay. Through the driver's side window? 
7 A. Right. 
8 Q. Okay. Did you actually get ID from that passenger? 
9 A. No, sir. 
10 Q. Did he identify himself to you? 
11 A. Yes, sir. 
12 Q. Okay. And after he identified himself, what did you 
13 then do? 
14 A. At that point I went back to my patrol vehicle, ran 
15 both of individuals' identification through the system. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, you didn't have identification for the 
17 passenger, but you had formal ID, driver's license or 
18 whatever, in your hand from the driver. Is that correct? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. Okay. So at that point they weren't free to leave. 
21 A. No, sir. 
22 Q. Okay. So you got on your computer -- how did you 
23 verify identification and whatnot? 
24 A. I just ran both names and date of birth they gave 
25 me, the one from the identification card, the other one by 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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what the passenger told me. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And there was actually a mugshot located on file for 
the passenger to verify that he was who he said he was. 
Q. Okay. Referring strictly to the passenger, then, 
you ran his name and 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you got 
photograph. Is that 
A. Correct. 
Q. And did the 
date of birth? 
identification which included a 
correct? 
photograph when you saw it on your 
computer screen appear to be the person that you had 
contacted? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. So at that point did you learn something 
about this individua 
A. Yes, sir. 
bail warrant from th 
1? 
I learned that he had a felony three, no 
e Board of Pardons. 
Q. Okay. So at what -- at that time what did you do? 
A. At that time I recontacted the passenger, and he was 
taken into custody. 
Q. You took him into custody right then? 
A. Yes,sir. 
Q. Okay. Now, as part of the normal custody, did you 
search the individual? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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A. I did. 
Q. And did you find something on him that you believed 
to be contraband? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where did that -- was that in the parking lot where 
that was found? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how did you find it? 
A. It was on his — it was in his pants pocket when I 
was searching him. 
Q. Okay. Did you find it or did he find it? 
A. He identified it to me, and then I found it where he 
said it was. 
Q. So how did he identify it to you? 
A. I asked him if there was anything illegal on his 
person while I was handcuffing him. He said, Yes, I have 
meth. 
Q. Okay. So then you reached in, you found it, you 
pulled it out? 
A. Correct. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And you had seen substances like that before? 
Yes, sir. 
That you knew to be meth? 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. Did you believe that to be meth at that time? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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A. I did. 
Q. Okay. He was arrested on a warrant. Did you also 
book him on possession of methamphetamine? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. I want to show you some pictures. We've sort 
of moved beyond it, but I want to show you some pictures that 
are marked for the purpose of identification and ask if you 
recognize these. These are marked as State's exhibits 
although they're actually defendant's copies of these 
photographs. Do you recognize that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what is that? 
A. That's the trailhead parking lot. 
Q. Okay. This may be a better view of it. This is No. 
2? 
A. Yeah, that's where you come in off Mountain Road 
right there. 
Q. Okay. And then this is No. 3. What is this? 
A. The entrance to the trailhead is part, I believe. 
Q. That's the entrance -- the actual entrance to the 
trailhead. You have to walk under that -- that facility --
it looks like an arbor of some sort --
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. -- to get on there? Okay. Thank you. No. 4, 
another picture of same thing. Is that right? 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 A. Yes, sir. 
2 Q. And No. 5 may be the same. Is that correct? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. Are there any markings there that say anything about 
5 the hours, or did you see -- whether they're in the 
6 photographs or not, did you see any signs that talk about the 
7 hours? 
8 A. No, sir. 
9 Q. So whatever the hours are is just based upon your 
10 understanding about what trailheads are. 
11 A. Correct. 
12 MR. DECARIA: Okay. I have no further questions of 
13 the witness except to ask that these items be admitted into 
14 evidence. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. 
16 MR. BOUWHUIS: No objection. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. They are received. 
18 MR. BOUWHUIS: You still have the photos? 
19 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
20 MR. DECARIA: Do you want me to get them back? 
21 MR. BOUWHUIS: Yeah, if you could just hand them to 
22 the witness, please. 
2 3 THE WITNESS: 
24 I MR. BOUWHUIS 
25 
Thank you. 
You know what? Actually I don't have 
any questions, Your Honor 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 You may stand down. 
3 Mr. DeCaria? 
4 MR. DECARIA: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis? 
6 MR. BOUWHUIS: As I indicated earlier, Your Honor, I 
7 just -- I just received his -- his brief on this. We've 
8 decided to take testimony today, but I would like an 
9 opportunity to review that and then argue on another 
10 occasion. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. How much time? When do you want 
12 this set? 
13 MR. BOUWHUIS: Whatever your calendar will 
14 accommodate, couple of weeks. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. DeCaria? 
16 MR. DECARIA: It's fine with the State, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll set this, then, on the 
18 28th, nine o'clock. 
19 MR. BOUWHUIS: 2 8th? 
2 0 THE COURT: June. 
21 MR. DECARIA: I apologize. I will not be here on 
22 the 28th. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 21st of June. 
2 4 MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: The Court will retain these pictures in 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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the file 
Mr. Dickerson, I'll see you back here then 
(End of proceedings.) 
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1 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
2 | COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter 
4 | in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
5 | foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the 
6 I videotape recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled 
7 matter. 
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I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or 
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a 
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or 
financially interested directly or indirectly in this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 8th day of August, 2007. 
*lWi/OU Co, 3 
Diane W. Flanagan 
Official Court Reporter 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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^ O N D DISTRICT COU*T 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS - 6498 
Attorney For Defendant 
2564 Washington Blvd., Suite 201 , r r,J 
Ogden,UT 84401 0 H i ' 
Telephone: (801) 393-6452 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, : OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. : 
DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON, : 
Case No. 071900647 
Defendant. : Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
COMES NOW the defendant, Derrall Craig Dickerson, by and through his attorney of 
record, and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
his Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
On the evening of April 1, 2007, at about 11:10 p.m., Officer Jared Francom of the Ogden 
Police Department was dispatched to the Nature Center located at 1100 North, Mountain Road, 
in Ogden, Utah. A refused complainant had reported that "there were people running around 
behind some houses in the foothills. The complainant also said that there was a vehicle parked in 
the parking lot of the Nature Center." • — -.i Tiaii'aiiiftiiit liiii'i'iiTiiii 
CD19624989 pages: 
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When Officer Francom arrived, he made contact with two individuals sitting in the 
vehicle. Defendant was a passenger. Officer Francom informed the passengers that they were 
trespassing because it was after dark, then ran their names for warrants. Defendant had a warrant 
for his arrest, and Francom arrested him. Francom asked Defendant if he had anything on his 
person Francom should know about, to which Defendant replied that he had some 
methamphetamine, which was indeed found on his person. 
Defendant was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance (DFZ), Second Degree 
Felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (DFZ), Class A Misdemeanor. 
ARGUMENT 
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . 
." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Utah Supreme Court has held that there are three levels of police-
citizen encounters, each of which requires a different degree of justification to be constitutionally 
permissible. 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable 
suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop;" 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. 
Merritt, 736 FJ2d 223, 230 (5th CirJ984)). To pass muster under the fourth amendment, the 
2 
seizure must be based on specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn 
from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude the defendant had committed or was 
about to commit a crime. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). 
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the requirement that an officer must 
have a reasonable suspicion to stop a person in Terry v. Ohio, U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Court in Terry stated: 
In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able 
to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion . . . In making that assessment it is imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard . . . . Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. 
Id. at 21-22. The requirement of reasonable suspicion has also been codified in Section 77-7-15, 
Utah Code Annotated (1990) : 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed, or is in the act 
of committing, or is attempting to commit a public offense, and 
may demand his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. 
Under this section, a police officer may detain an individual if he or she has an articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617-18 (Utah 1987). There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable suspicion. 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). Whether the officer had reasonable 
suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances. Id. The "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis must be based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion that the particular 
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418, 
j 
101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 
199J). 
In this case, Officer Francom responded to the scene and approached the defendant based 
on his belief that a city trespassing ordinance applied to that particular location and that the 
defendant was in violation of that ordinance. Ogden City does indeed have a trespassing 
ordinance which makes it unlawful for persons to enter city parks at any time from one hour after 
sunset to one hour before sunrise. Ogden City Ordinance 11-3-2. The ordinance also requires 
that the time restrictions be posted at the main entrance to the park. (A copy of this ordinance is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A"). 
This particular location, however, has two problems that render the trespassing ordinance 
inapplicable: 1) the Nature Center appears to be more of a trailhead than a city park,1 and 2) there 
is no sign posted indicating the time restrictions for entrance. (See copies of photos of the area, 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit UB"). 
At the time the preliminary hearing in this matter was waived, the State stipulated that the 
officer, if called to testify, would say that he does not recall seeing a "no trespassing" sign 
posted, but was relying on the city trespassing ordinance in responding to the scene and "seizing" 
the defendant. 
xThe question of whether the location at issue is a trail head or a city park is probably 
moot for purposes of this motion, however, because the ordinance requires the time restrictions 
to be posted at the main entrance to the park. Therefore, if the location is a park, the ordinance is 
not met because there is no sign posted. If it's not a park, a sign need not be posted because the 
trespassing ordinance does not apply. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
The sole basis for Officer Francom's suspicion of criminal activity was his belief that the 
city's trespassing ordinance applied to the area and the defendant's presence in the area. This 
belief, however, was not reasonable because Ogden City's trespassing ordinance does not apply: 
either the area was not a city park, or the required time restrictions were not posted. 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant asks that the evidence obtained as a result of the 
illegal stop be suppressed and that the charges be dismissed. "If a seizure occurs and the police 
are unable to point to specific and articulable facts that justified that seizure, the seizure violates 
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a result of the 
illegal seizure must be excluded." " State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). See also 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (Evidence obtained 
subsequent to an illegal stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree.") 
DATED th i s /4 day of May 2007. 
MICHAEL D.vBOUWHUlS-3 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
with postage prepaid thereon, to Weber County Prosecutor, 2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd FL, 
Ogden UT 84401, this / (f day of May 2007. 
4•- ^h-/:'j ^pt ^fa^ L 
Secretary 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
-3-2: TRESPASSING ON CITY PARKS, CEMETERIES AND ... http://www.sterlingcodifiers.eom/UT/Ogden/l3003000000002000.htm 
11-3-2: TRESPASSING ON CITY PARKS, CEMETERIES AND GOLF 
COURSES: 
A. Parks: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon any City park at any time from one 
hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when participating in or attending an 
activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and except for 
persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway. 
B. Cemetery: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City cemetery at any time 
from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except for the day before Memorial 
Day and Memorial Day, when the hours when no person shall enter or be upon the City 
cemetery shall be between ten o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M. 
C. Golf Courses: It is unlawful for any person to enter or be upon the City golf courses between 
the hours of ten o'clock (10:00) P.M. and four o'clock (4:00) A.M. 
D. Posting Of Time Restrictions: The time restrictions shall be posted at the main entrance to 
the park, cemetery, or golf course. 
E. Violation; Penalty: A violation of this Section is a Class C misdemeanor, subject to the 
penalties provided under Title 1, Chapter 4 of this Code. 
(1979 Code § 9.03.020; Ord. 98-46, 6-23-1998) 
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MARK R. DECARIA, UBN 0850 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
Zi.il 1 J ^ . ' " " - 7 F:;i2--57 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DERRALL CRAIG DICKERSON, ] 
Defendant. 
1 STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
> MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
) Case No. 071900647 JUfil - „ , 
) ( c 
) Judge: Parley R. Baldwin 
COMES NOW, Mark R. DeCaria, Weber County Attorney, and respectfully submits this 
Memorandum of Law to support the State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
i to Defendant's Motion to Suppress E 
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FACTS 
The Arrest 
Near midnight1 on April Fool's Day (April 1, 2007), Officer Francom responded to a 
trespassing complaint that there were people running around behind houses in the foothills by 
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature 
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Upon arrival, Officer Francom viewed a vehicle parked in the 
ONCN parking lot, just as the caller had described. Two men occupied the vehicle. Officer 
Francom approached the two males, informed them that they were trespassing, and asked them 
both for identification. The vehicle's passenger did not have identification but verbally identified 
himself as Derrall "Craig" Dickerson. Upon running Dickerson's name, Officer Francom found 
that Dickerson had a warrant for his arrest.2 Officer Francom arrested Dickerson and later found 
methamphetamine on his person. 
Ogden Nature Center, North 
The ONCN3 is an annex of the Ogden Nature Center (ONC)4. Both the ONC and ONCN 
are maintained and operated by a private, non-profit company on land that is leased to them by 
Ogden City. The ONC has limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. The ONCN also has 
limited hours of operation—closed from dusk until dawn. 
'23:10 Hours 
2
 In total, Dickerson had an NCIC hit, a felony three no bail warrant for his arrest from the board of pardons, 
and a misdemeanor warrant from Weber county. 
3
 Located at 1175 N. Mountain Rd., Ogden, Utah 84404. The ONCN is just North of where Harrison Boulevard 
becomes Mountain Road. 
4
 Located at 966 W. 12th Street, Ogden, Utah 84404. 
There are two signs near the ONCN entrance indicating that the area is part of the 
ONC—one at the main entrance to the parking lot and another on a wooden recycle bin near the 
park's entrance. The parking lot is surrounded by a wooden fence, and the rest of the trail along 
Mountain Road is blocked by a chain fence. The wooden fence surrounding the parking lot opens 
for a wooden arbor—the entrance. The trail is only accessible through the entrance beyond the 
parking lot. Just through the arbor there is a bulletin board on which there is a sign that reads, 
'The park is open from dawn until dusk." Other than the ONCN trail, the area around Mountain 
Road is residential with some properties boarding the ONCN property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICER FRANCOM'S STOP AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
REASONABLE UNDER THE 4™ AMENDMENT 
The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the 
14th Amendment and adopted by the Utah State Constitution, only protects persons against 
searches and seizures that are unreasonable.1 US. Const. Amend. IV. Utah Const.Art. I, § 14. 
Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). A reasonable search and seizure balances the 
competing interests of a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy against law enforcement's 
legitimate interest in crime prevention and investigating criminal activity. State v. Whittenback, 
621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Whether a search 
and seizure is reasonable is detemiined by a fact-intensive inquiry guided by a two-part analysis: 
(1) whether the officer's actions were justified at their inception and (2) whether the resulting 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." U.S. Const. 
Amend. IV. Utah Const. Art. I, § 14. 
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detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in 
the first place. Lopez at 1132. 
At issue here is whether a stop and seizure of a person, the defendant, was reasonable. 
There are three levels of reasonable, constitutionally permissible police to public encounters 
which may qualify as a seizure of a person: (1) an officer may approach a citizen and ask 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person 
if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has, is, or is about to commit a 
crime, and so long as the detention is temporary and lasts no longer than necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect so if the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the person has, is, or is about to commit a crime. State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617 (Utah 1987). 
A level two encounter is at issue here as the question presented is, first, whether Officer 
Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and question the defendant, and, second, 
whether Officer Francom acted within the reasonable scope of the stop in running a warrants 
check on the defendant. Both questions are answered in the affirmative. 
A. Officer Francom Had Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion to Stop the Defendant and 
Investigate a Possible Trespass. 
Under a level two encounter, a police officer may detain and question any person when 
the officer has an objective reasonable, articulable suspicion that person has, is, or is about to be 
involved in criminal activity. State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987). To amount to 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, the likelihood of criminal activity must be more than a hunch 
but need not rise to the level of persuasiveness of probable cause or the preponderance of the 
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evidence standard. State v. Alverez, 147 P.3d 425 (Utah 2006). State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507, 
509-10 (Utah 2005). Further, whether a seizure is reasonable and constitutional does not depend 
on whether the defendant is actually guilty of committing a crime but whether the officer has 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being committed. Whether a crime actually 
occurred is a question to be determined at trial. 
Reasonable, articulable suspicion is supported by an objective analysis of specific, 
articulable facts and logical inferences from those facts. Utah v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994). Whether those facts amount to reasonable, articulable suspicion depends upon the totality 
of the circumstances, not individual facts viewed in isolation. Markland at 510. Alverez at 432.2 
To support reasonable, articulable suspicion, an officer may rely on his training, experience, and 
subjective belief. Alverez at 432. An officer's suspicion may also be based on information 
received from another person if that "tip" bears some indicia of reliability. Id at 433. An officer 
may additionally rely on a dispatched report in making an investigatory stop. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 at 940 (Utah 1994). 
Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant and 
investigate a possible trespass. Near midnight, on April Fool's Day, Officer Francom responded 
to a complaint that there were people running around in the foothills behind some houses on 
Mountain Road. Additionally, the complaint reported a vehicle parked in the Ogden Nature 
Center, North (ONCN) parking lot. Complying with his duty to investigate complaints, Officer 
2In determining whether a police officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion, the courts may not use a "divide 
and conquer analysis." In other words, they cannot determine the individual facts in isolation to determine whether 
each fact has an innocent explanation. Rather, the courts must look to the :totality of the circumstances" to 
determine whether, taken together, the facts warranted further investigation by a police officer. State v. Alverez. at 
432. 
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Francom arrived to find a car in the ONCN parking lot, thus confirming part of the complaint to 
which the officer was responding, thereby showing that the complaint was reliabable. 
Two men sat in the car. The parking lot, but for their car, was empty. The trail past the 
parking lot was fenced off, both around the parking lot and along Mountain Road, thus indicating 
that use of the trail was somewhat restricted and that a certain level of privacy was wanted. Given 
the darkness and lateness of the hour, the trail was likely not fit to be hiked upon.3 Given the 
lapse of time between the complaining call and Officer Francom's response, the two men in the 
car were probably in the dark, empty parking lot for an unreasonable amount of time. 
Additionally, given that the trail is only accessible through the entrance in the parking lot where 
these two men were parked, coupled with the residential nature of the area and the established 
reliability of the complaining call, it is reasonable that these two men could have been the people 
running around in the foothills behind houses, alarming the residents. 
All these facts and their rational inferences, looked at together as the totality of the 
circumstances created a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had occurred or was 
occurring. Further, the possibility that a trespass has occurred or was occurring gave Officer 
Francom a duty to investigate. 
B. A Warrants Check on the Defendant Was Within the Reasonable Scope of the 
Detention as Part of Officer Francom's Trespass Investigation 
Once an officer stops a person for a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime has, is, 
or is about to be committed, that detention may continue so long as it is temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Dietman, 739 P. 2d 616, 
3
 Additionally, had the two men intended to use the trail for hiking, as it is supposed to be used, they would 
have seen the hours of operation immediately after walking through the arbor. 
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617 (Utah 1987). For example, running a warrants check on a properly stopped driver does not 
exceed the scope of detention, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention 
beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and issue a 
citation. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994). 
Running a warrants check is an appropriate form of investigation and does not exceed the 
scope of detention even if a person is stopped for something other than a traffic violation. State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995). In State v. Chapman, the defendant and another 
person were parked in an empty school parking lot after dark, late at night. Id. An officer stopped 
the defendant for violating a loitering ordinance. Id. The defendant identified himself to the 
officer, after which the officer ran a warrants check on the defendant, which came back negative. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court found this stop reasonable because the officer had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the loitering ordinance was being violated. Id. Additionally, the scope 
of the stop was reasonable because, though not a "routine traffic stop," the warrants check was a 
reasonable form of investigation that did not "significantly extend the period of detention beyond 
that reasonably necessary . . . . " Id. 
A warrants check on the defendant was within the reasonable scope of detention as part of 
Officer Francom's trespass investigation. Similar to Chapman, wherein a warrants check was 
reasonable as part of an investigation for a loitering ordinance violation, it was likewise 
reasonable for Officer Francom to investigate a trespass by running a warrants check on the 
defendant. Running a warrants check is a valid form of investigation so long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention, and there is no indication that the defendant was 
detained any longer than necessary for the officer to investigate the possible trespass. 
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II. 
THE OGDEN CITY MUNICIPAL CODE AGAINST TRESPASSING IN CITY PARKS 
DOES NOT APPLY TO THE OGDEN NATURE CENTER, NORTH 
The Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) makes it unlawful for any person to enter or be 
upon any city park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise.1 Ogden City 
Ordinance 11'-3-2(A). Additionally, that time restriction must be posted at the park's main 
entrance.2 Ogden City Ordinance ll-3-2(D). 
Neither the Ogden Nature Center (ONC) nor the Ogden Nature Center, North (ONCN) 
are a public city park or trail head as neither are listed as public city parks3 or trail heads4 on the 
Ogden City website.5 Additionally, the ONC and ONCN are operated by a private, non-profit 
company on land that is leased to them by Ogden City. The ONC is not free to public access as 
there are limited hours of operation and an entrance fee. Though an annex with no entrance fee, 
the ONCN also has limited hours of operation, closed from dusk until dawn. These hours of 
operation are posted just past the trail's entrance. 
Because the ONC and ONCN are not public city parks, the criminal trespassing statute6, 
and not the OCMC, applies. However, even if the ONCN were a public city park subject to the 
OCMC, the reasonableness of a seizure is not detennined by whether the ordinance was actually 
1
 Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: A. Parks: "It is unlawful for any person to enter or 
be upon any City park at any time from one hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise, except when 
participating in or attending an activity sponsored by the City or allowed under a permit issued by the City, and 
except for persons crossing a park on a regularly established walkway." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-3-2(A). 
2
 Trespassing on City Parks, Cemeteries, and Golf Courses: D. Post of Time Restrictions: "The time restrictions 
shall be posted at the main entrance to the park, cemetery, or golf course." Ogden City Municipal Code 11-3-
2(D). 
3List of Ogden City Public Parks: http://www.ogdenci^.com/index.php?module:=ibcms&fxn=parks.main 
4
 List of Ogden Trail Networks: http://www.ogdencitYxom/index.php?n'iodule=ibcms&fxri:=:ogdentrails.mairi 
5
 Ogden City website: http://www.ogdencih-.com/ 
6
 Criminal Trespass Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (2007). 
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violated but by whether Office Francom has reasonable, articulable suspicion to think that a 
trespass had occurred or was occurring. Whether a trespass actually occurred is a question to be 
determined at trial. Because of the reasoanble, articulable suspicion presented by the facts above, 
Officer Francom still had a duty to investigate a possible trespass and it is this investigation that 
led to the defendant's eventual arrest followed by the discovery of drugs on the defendant's 
person. 
CONCLUSION 
First, Officer Francom conducted a constitutional seizure with requisite reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or was occurring. The complaining call 
and its subsequent verification, the car in an otherwise empty parking lot, the lateness and 
darkness of the hour, the limited accessibility of the trail coiipled with the restriction and privacy 
indicated by the surrounding fence, and the otherwise residential nature of the area are all 
articulable facts creating a totality of the circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred 
that the two men in the car were not using the parking lot and trail for legitimate purposes and, 
thus, that some sort of a criminal activity was occurring-most likely, a trespass. 
Second, once Officer Francom had reasonable, articulable suspicion that a trespass had 
occurred or was occurring he only detained the defendant as long as necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop. Officer Francom investigated by running a warrants check which is a 
legitimate form of investigation for stops, whether they are traffic related or not. 
Third, the Ogden City Municipal Code (OCMC) against trespassing does not apply to the 
ONCN because the trail is run by a private, non-profit company and it is not considered a public 
city park or trail head by Ogden City. Additionally, even if the OCMC against trespassing did 
-9-
apply to the ONCN, whether or not a trespass actually occurred is irrelevant. The question, 
instead, is whether Office Francom had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was ongoing 
criminal activity which gave him a duty to investigate. 
Defendant's Motion to For the foregoing reasons, the State requests the Court deny 
Suppress Evidence. Dated the jf day of June, 2007. / 
^ 4 <j 4 r< g - i f ^ / 
Mark DeCaria 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
thereby certify that I mailed or hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing on 
th i s^J^day of June, 2007, a copy of the STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to: 
Michael D. Bouwhuis 
Attorney for the Defendant 
2564 Washington Blvd., Suit 201 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
telephone: (801) 393-6452 
t{_<^ k V 4C 
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